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While the intra-household allocation of time and resources has been studied 
extensively in general literature, related research on Chinese households remains 
limited. In this paper, we apply a collective model of household labor supply with 
household production to explore the evolution of the allocation of family income and 
labor supply in urban China during economic transition. Using data from China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CRNS) for the years 1989, 1997 and 2006, we find that 
both men and women reduced their labor supply in the market and increased their 
leisure time; women also increased their labor supply at home while men did not. 
There is evidence that the husbands worked in the market to exchange market goods 
for domestic goods their wives produced at home. The amount of exchange has 
increased over the years, indicating that gender division of labor has become 
increasingly clear-cut. As men's total consumption continued to grow, women had to 
contribute more to the household, suggesting that the gender differentials in 
expenditures were widening. We also analyze the effects of wage rates and 
demographic characteristics on individual labor supply to housework and the 
distribution of expenditures among spouses. The estimation results show that wages 
are the most important determinants in both aspects of behavior based on the three 
waves of data: respondents increased their share of housework when their relative 
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I. Introduction 
The intra-household distribution of labor supply in the market and at home and the 
allocation of family income are of paramount importance to policy making as they 
present information on people's behavioral rules and reflect the status of social 
welfare. Studies on these subjects in developing countries hold special significance 
because the economic agents' (individual or household) interaction with the outside 
world through market activities is relatively restricted compared with developed 
countries. Households are largely self-sufficient and predisposed to using household 
service as a substitute for market-provided goods. Thus, concentrating merely on 
market exchanges may neglect the mechanism of household economy in developing 
countries. 
The issue holds a distinct significance for China, which has undergone rapid 
economic growth as well as profound societal changes in the last three decades. The 
income of workers in urban areas has been rising swiftly as the average real wage 
increased by sevenfold from 1978 to 20071• Meanwhile, gender inequality of wages 
expanded. Although macro-level statistical data remains insufficient, various surveys 
have offered necessary evidence. The female-male wage rate ratio is reported to be 
0.84 in 19882. In the Urban Household Survey (URS) data, this number is 0.78 in 
1995 and 0.65 in 1999 (Yueh, 2004). A recent on-line pole shows that this ratio 
dropped to 0.62 in 20083. The structure of urban households has likewise evolved. 
1 See Appendix Table 1 for details. 
2 Tan Lin. Report on Gender Inequality and Women Development in China (1995-2005). Social Science Academic 
Press (China). 2006. 
3 Li Xiao-ning (2008), "Research on the Gender-Wage Difference Problem in Cities Labor Market", Statistics and 
Information Forum, Vol. 23, No. 9, pp. 90-96. 
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Following the family planning policy implemented in the 1970s, the average urban 
household size shrank from 3.89 to 2.90 from 1985 to 2008, and the average number 
of employed persons per household dropped from 2.15 to 1.504. The growth in 
people's income, the widening gender differentials in the labor market, and the 
fundamental changes in household structure in theory have created a significant 
impact on the intra-household distribution of labor and resources. However, research 
on the subj ect remains scarce. 
A possible barrier to research IS a dearth of data containing information on 
individual time spent on housework, such as childcare and housekeeping. Our data 
obtained from the China Household Nutrition Survey (CRNS) provide detailed 
information on individual allocation of time both within and outside the home, as well 
as other personal and household characteristics. The three waves selected for this 
study include the first (1989) and the last (2006) years of the survey, as well as an 
intermediate year, 1997, which marked the beginning of the radical labor 
retrenchment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, the analysis covers a 
significant timeframe and reveals labor market changes during economic reform. 
This study aims to fill the void in existing literature by answering the following 
questions: (1) What are the effects of market wage rates and demographic 
characteristics on individual labor supply at home? (2) What are the differences 
between male and female behavior in household production and market labor? (3) 
How is family income distributed between husbands and wives? (4) How did all the 
4 See Appendix Table 2 for details. 
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above features change over the period covered by the data, and what message does it 
convey regarding the transition of the Chinese labor market and urban households? 
We adopt a collective model of household labor supply with household production, 
which is based on the work of Apps and Rees (1996). However, we ext~nd the 
utilization of this framework to examine intra-household allocation. This model's 
advantage lies in its ability to portray an overall picture of people's behavior both 
outside and inside the household and analyze pertinent issues. The household is 
assumed to be composed of rational individuals whose utilities are determined by 
their consumption of a composite market good, a domestically produced good, and 
leisure. 
First, functions of individual housework shares are estimated to examIne the 
effects of wage rates and demographic variables on labor supply at home. The results 
yield a significant impact of one's relative wage to the spouse's on the ratio of labor 
supply to household production. An individual takes a larger share of housework 
when his relative wage rate increases. We then derive the domestic good's implicit 
price from the estimation results, and estimate the functions of individual allocation of 
consumptions between market good, domestic good and leisure. Demographic 
variables have neither significant nor continuous effects on the allocation; wages 
create a significantly positive effect on one's consumption of leisure and market good 
and a negative effect on domestic good, although no obvious trend in the magnitude 
of effects is observed. Further, we calculate the production and expenditures of each 
individual using estimation results and reveal the division of work and consumptions 
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as well as its evolution. 
Our findings demonstrate that men work more in the labor market while women 
assume more responsibilities at home. Gender differentials continued to expand. This 
was true especially between 1997 and 2006, possibly the consequence of the massive 
lay-offs which began in the late 1990s. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 11 is a comprehensive literature review 
on topics related to our analysis; Section III introduces the theoretical model and 
empirical specification; Section IV describes the data and provides the empirical 
results and interpretations; and Section V concludes the paper. 
11. Literature Review 
Our study is closely related to several subjects. The labor market's transition in urban 
China during the economic restructuring and the expansion of gender earnings gap 
provide the background for our analysis and offers explanations to phenomena 
observed in the data. Male and female labor participation and intra-household 
allocation are the issues we intend to examine among Chinese households. A review 
of these topics indicates the uniqueness of our research. The collective model of labor 
supply is the basis of our framework and a review of its development is presented. 
Thus our literature review covers these five SUbjects. 
2.1 China's evolving labor market 
Previous research has shown that China's labor market is gradually shifting to a more 
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open one as an offshoot of the economic reforms. The planning framework within the 
organization of labor has been gradually removed and the market system has assumed 
an increasingly important role (Li and Zax, 2002; Fleisher and Yang, 2003; Cai et aI., 
2008). 
Labor market development has resulted in two entire 1 y different consequences on 
workers. On the one hand, the flow of labor force has become smoother, allowing 
workers to locate more suitable jobs or become re-employed shortly after 
retrenchment. On the other hand, enterprises, especially the SOEs, now enjoy greater 
autonomy and face fiercer competitions, which have led to job instability and job loss 
for workers, who upon losing their jobs find it difficult to obtain a new one. Thus the 
overall effect of this transition remains to be observed, and this study attempts to 
provide substantial evidence. 
Developments notwithstanding, severe segmentations exist in various dimensions. 
Appleton et aI. (2004) investigated the three tiers in the labor market comprising 
recently retrenched and re-employed urban workers, non-retrenched urban workers, 
and rural-urban migrants, showing evidence that the urban market is segmented into 
these categories. Fan (2002) studied the differences among three sUbpopulations: 
non-migrant urban natives, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants, claiming 
that status is crucial to explaining labor market segmentation. Demurger et aI. (2006) 
analyzed the evolution of labor market segmentation in urban China and observed 
substantial differences across ownership, economic sectors and regions. All these 
findings suggest that China's labor market is far from efficient, in which the gender 
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differentials may be more serious and have a bigger impact on labor supply. 
2.2 Gender earnings gap in the labor market in urban China 
The gender earnings gap is likewise an important feature of the labor market in urban 
China. Dong and Bowles (2002) examined segmentation based on the enterprise's 
ownership category and observed that gender wage discrimination is present in all 
categories. 
Majority of studies demonstrate a widening gap, especially in selected groups 
within the population. Millimet and Wang (2006) examined the uniformity of gender 
income differentials across the entire distribution, and indicated that differentials in 
predicted earnings across gender in the lower tail of the distribution are largest and 
increasing. N g (2004 & 2007) analyzed the change in the female-male earnings ratio, 
demonstrating that the region with relatively rapid economic reforms carried the 
highest ratio. Other studies indicated that the gender gap existed in various aspects. 
Hughes and Maurer-Fazio (2002) studied the way in which the gender wage gap 
differs according to marital status, education and occupation. Liu et al. (2000) 
compared the gender wage differentials and discrimination among individuals 
employed in three sectors-the state sector, the collective sector, and the private 
sector. Zhang and Dong (2008) contrasted the significance of gender wage gaps 
between state-owned enterprises and private firms. However, compared to most 
industrialized and developing nations, the differentials were relatively small, albeit 
continuously increasing (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Shen and Deng, 2008). 
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There are several explanations for the gender earnings gap, the most popular of 
which is gender discrimination, as recorded by many works such as Liu (2007), Chi 
and Li (2007), Wang and Cai (2008), to name a few. The effect of education on gender 
gap was also examined. Bauer et al. (1992) and Bishop et al. (2005) found this effect 
to be decreasing, while Zhang et aI. (2008) argued that gender gaps in employment 
and earnings were strongly related to family status rather than human capital. The 
impact of other factors on the gender earnings gap was analyzed as well, including 
culture (Clark et aI., 1991), liberalization (Maurer-Fazio, 2002; Demurger et aI., 2007), 
globalization (Shu et aI., 2007), market transition (Shu and Bian, 2003), economic 
segmentation (Shu, 2005), and so on. All of these, with the exception of culture, 
reportedly contributed to the growing gap. 
A study related to our research is Li et aI. 's (2006) work, which studied the 
relative contribution of Chinese spouses to the family income from the perspective of 
gender earning differences. Their findings depicted the role of urban husbands as the 
main financial supporters of their families, which became relatively important during 
economic transition. 
These works described the characteristics of China's labor market and the 
profound changes taking place. Our research seeks to analyze the effect of these 
characteristics and changes on the behavior of Chinese households. 
2.3 Male and female labor force participation 
Our research intends to examine the pattern and evolution of male and female labor 
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force participation In China's labor market, therefore necessitating a look into 
concrete measures designed to address these issues. 
Existing literature on labor force participation focused on female participation and 
labor supply. Theoretical works include those of Heckman and Willis (1977), 
Heckman (1978), Fleisher and Rhodes (1979), Nakamura et al. (1979), Hill (1983), 
Mroz (1987), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Goldin (1994), and Hyslop (1999), to 
name a few. The abovementioned works attempted to create a model for the labor 
supply and participation decisions of women from various perspectives, such as in the 
life-long run (life-cycle model) and in the short run (one-period decision model). 
Heckman and Willis (1977) discovered the U-shape of female labor supply in the life 
cycle, and Goldin (1994) explored why the reason why U-shape was traced out. 
Empirical studies involved several aspects. First, patterns of female labor supply 
were described. Schultz (1990) studied the development of female participation in the 
labor market from a worldwide perspective. Layard et al. (1980), Goldin (1989), 
Hayghe (1997), and Blau and Kahn (2006) focused on the United States scenario 
within different time periods. Bryant et al. (2004) and Johnston (2005) studied the 
case of New Zealand, while Tansel (2001) examined that of Turkey. These works 
portrayed varying images of female labor supply across regions. 
Second, the determinants of female participation were identified. Pampel and 
Tanaka (1986) studied cross-national determinants of female labor force participation, 
revealing the curvilinear effects of economic development as well as family, social 
and demographic explanations. Jaumotte (2003) examined the same issue but in the 
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OECD countries, focusing on a number of policy instruments such as the tax 
treatment of second earners, childcare subsidies, paid maternity and parental leaves. 
Smith and Ward (1985) explored the reasons behind the growth of the US female 
labor force in the 20th century, attributing it to wage increase. Weiss and Gronau 
(1981) identified the link between wages, interruptions, discriminations and labor 
force participation, highlighting the strong interdependency between lifetime plans of 
labor force participation, level of earnings, and earnings growth. 
The impact of other variables on the female labor supply participation was 
likewise examined, including fertility (Fleisher and Rhode, 1979; Bloom et aI., 2007), 
childcare costs (Connelly, 1992; Ribar, 1992), social culture (Ferber, 1982; Reimers, 
1985; Fernandez, 2007), wage and income increase (Layard et aI., 1980), policy 
changes (Sundstr6m and Stafford, 1992), expected interruptions in labor supply 
(Weiss, 1981), and so on. Different explanations were offered regarding these factors. 
Finally, although rather limited, the effect of female labor force participation was 
studied and the objects of the effect include inequalities in family income (Danziger, 
1980; Bergmann et aI., 1980; Gronau, 1982), spousal violence against women 
(Macmillan and Gartner, 1999), social structures (Semyonov, 1980), and so on. 
Studies on male labor force participation were limited, perhaps owing to the 
traditional role of men in labor. Juhn (1992) described the decline of male 
participation in the United States from 1967 to 1987 and examined the relationship 
between the decline and changes in wage rates. Parsons offered a series of 
explanations on the decline in male participation, including racial trends (Parsons, 
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AER, 1980), welfare alternatives (Parsons, JPE, 1980) and health (Parsons, 1982). 
Wilkie (1991) examined the impact of this decline on the economic support structure 
of the family. 
Despite a wealth of research on labor force participation, studies that focused on 
China's labor market are quite limited. Fan (2003) studied the gender composition of 
China's labor force and gender segmentation in the urban labor market. Giles et al. 
(2006) observed that the rate of unemployment doubled and labor force participation 
declined by 8.9 percent during the period of economic restructuring. These works fall 
short in terms of providing a full understanding of labor force participation in urban 
China. 
The present study alms to enhance the current trove of related research by 
describing and explaining the trend of male and female labor force participation. 
2.4 Intra-household allocation 
The intra-household allocation with Chinese urban households is an important part of 
our study. Existing literature on this issue mainly focused on two subjects: the 
distribution of family income and the allocation of housework between spouses. 
Among those who pioneered in studying the distribution of family earnings, Smith 
(1979) investigated the influence of wives' earnings on the distribution of family 
income and underscored the different equalizing effects of earnings among wives 
from white and black families. Beston and Gaag (1984) conducted a similar research, 
concluding that the equalizing impact of wives' earnings on total household income 
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inequality became increasingly important in the period spannIng 1968 to 1980. 
Winegarden (1987) studied the effect of women's labor force participation on 
household income inequality and discovered that the direction and strength of such 
effect depended on the level of women's participation. Other studies examined 
long-term distribution of income. Shaw (1989) examined this issue from the 
perspective of lifecycle and observed that the equalizing effect was greater on the 
distribution of lifetime family earnings than on the distribution of annual family 
earnings. Blundell et al. (1994) examined the determinants of the allocation of goods 
within one period and over the lifecycle, and identified the important effects of 
demographics, labor market status and other household characteristics on the 
intertemporal allocation of expenditure. 
Studies on the distribution of household labor were relatively sufficient. A handful 
of works attempted to describe the gender differentials from varying perspectives. 
Hersch and Stratton (1994) and Ramos (2005) offered evidence for gender 
differentials in domestic work time, market work time and total work time, painting a 
rather "traditional" picture of women working more at home and spending less time in 
the labor market compared with men, although the differentials were narrowing. 
Different behaviors were observed in different types of household. For example, 
Berardo (1987) compared the different amount of time that spouses spent on 
housework between dual-career and single-earner households, and Ferree (1991) 
focused on dual-earner families to investigate the dimensions of variability and 
change in the gender division of labor. Research on the change of housework over a 
11 
long period of time, as well as cross-national differences were conducted. Bianchi et 
aI. (2000) observed that in America, the number of overall hours allotted for domestic 
labor (excluding childcare and shopping) had continued to decline since the 1960s 
mainly due to dramatic declines in women's housework, while men's housework time 
almost doubled during the same period. Gershuny and Robinson (1988) traced 
historical changes in the distribution of housework between men and women in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Kalleberg and Rosenfeld (1990) examined the 
differences in interrelationships by sex between domestic work and work in the 
market in four countries. A handful of works paid special attention to women's share 
of housework. Fox and Nickols (1983) argued that the employment of women outside 
the home in paid work was significantly related to their share of housework, but had 
little effect on that of husbands or children. Maret and Finley (1984) investigated the 
domestic responsibility of women in dual-earner families and reported substantial 
variability as well as an observable decrease in the extent of home responsibilities. 
Other studies delved on the determinants of the division of housework and the 
effects of many variables. Several works attributed the unequal division of domestic 
work between spouses to ideologies on social sex-roles (Stafford et aI., 1977; Ross, 
1987; Kamo, 1988; Blair and Lichter, 1991; Alvarez and Miles, 2003; Lewin-Epstein 
et aI., 2006). Nickols and Metzen (1978) observed that family size exerted pressure on 
wives to increase their time allotted for housework. Bird et al. (1984) and Greenstein 
(1996) suggested that the role of ideology be considered. Brines (1994) and 
Greenstein (2000) presented a link between wives' economic dependence on their 
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husbands and the specialization of housework, for which Davis and Greenstein (2006) 
earned little support, and Bonke (2007) claimed that such specialization varied with 
economic circumstances, time constraints, and social values. Rexroat (1987) and 
Pittman and Blanchard (1996) examined the division of household labor in a lifelong 
cycle, highlighting the effects of childbearing, work history, timing of marriage, and 
so on. Fuwa (2004) argued that macro-level factors such as egalitarianism were 
equally important in the dynamics of housework distribution between spouses. Farkas 
(1976) and Millimet (2000) examined the impact of children on family labor supply. 
Solaz (2005) analyzed the possible transfers of domestic work between partners 
facing an external shock such as recent childbirth or the unemployment of one spouse. 
Alenezi and Miles (2004) estimated the effects of price changes in market goods and 
input goods of household production on the division of housework. 
Traditionally, husbands were viewed as the "breadwinner" while WIves were 
expected to accomplish the housework, thus special attention was accorded to 
husbands' participation in household labor. It was observed that husbands' income 
was usually negatively related to their share of household labor (Ericksen et aI., 1979), 
while the relative wage rates, employment in the labor market, and wives' higher 
educational level tended to increase this share (Farkas, 1976; Nickols and Metzen, 
1978; Ericksen et aI., 1979; Coverman, 1985; Barnett, 1987; Kamo, 1988; Cohen, 
2004; Davis and Greenstein, 2006; Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2008). However, 
opposite results were likewise derived, for example, Nickols and Metzen (1982) 
reported that wives' employment time created little impact on their husbands ' 
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housework time. 
The long list of literature we presented here reflects depth of available knowledge 
on intra-household allocation and the different phenomena uncovered by our study. 
Despite the breadth of works focusing on this issue, research concentrating on the 
Chinese households remains scarce. Chen (2005) studied a related topic focusing on 
how the change in employment from an agricultural to a non-agricultural job could 
modify the division of labor at home. However, Chen's studies were quite specific and 
failed to tackle the allocation of family income. Thus, our study is most valuable in 
that it is among the first to offer comprehensive analyses on the intra-household 
allocation in Chinese families. 
2.5 The collective model of labor supply 
The collective model of labor supply evolves from the traditional approach of 
household decision making, which assumes that the household behaves as a single 
unit and aims to maximize a unique utility function by allocating total available time 
between leisure consumption and market labor supply. It originated from Becker's 
analysis on time allocation (Becker, 1965). 
This "neoclassical" fonnulation, or the "unitary" or "joint" labor supply model, 
has been criticized for its methodological and empirical deficiencies. First, it 
contradicts the basic neoclassical assumptions of rational individuals. Since the 
household consists of several members, its behavior should be analyzed as the result 
of several individually rational decisions made by each member. Second, its single 
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dichotomization of time into leisure and market work ignores a significant proportion 
of time allocated for housework, which could cause misleading results. Finally, it is 
unable to explain a number of empirical facts, such as the assumption of income 
pooling which is always rejected, the compensated substitution effects between male 
and female leisure that are found to be asymmetric, the inequality hidden within 
households, and so on. 
An alternative approach has been developed to overcome these deficiencies, 
where household behavior is modeled as a "collective" consequence of individual 
decisions. Early literature on collective household decision processes has been 
confined to cooperative game theory, until Chiappori (1988) introduced a new 
framework consistent with the neoclassical assumption that individuals have distinct 
utility functions. Each member of the household, given one's budget constraint 
derived from others' choices, aims to maximize his own utility by dividing his time 
between work and leisure. Chiappori characterized the form of the model and 
discussed the falsifiable conditions derived under the basic assumptions of 
Pareto-efficient decisions and egoistic agents. Chiappori (1992) further presented an 
alternative interpretation of the model that divided the internal decision process into 
two stages, proving that testable restrictions on labor supplies could be generated and 
the observation of labor supply behavior was sufficient for recovering individual 
preferences and the sharing rule. 
However, in these two papers, Chiappori divided individual time use into labor 
supply in the market and leisure without considering a large portion of time 
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distributed to housework. Gronau (1973 & 1977) first formalized the trichotomy of 
work in the market, work at home, and leisure, and analyzed household production; 
his studies, however, assumed a unitary framework. Apps and Rees (1988 & 1996) 
incorporated household production in the collective model of labor supply and 
demonstrated the importance of taking it into account. Chiappori (1997) then 
modified his model with respect to household production and extended the results of 
his previous analyses. Browning and Chiappori (1998) derived testable implications 
of the collective framework and presented a general characterization of the collective 
model. Chiappori et al (2002) provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the 
impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. 
Donni (2003) explained that Chiappori's main conclusions could be generalized when 
participatory decisions and nonlinear budget constraints were considered, and studied 
ways to measure the incidence of income tax on household labor supply. Blundell et 
al. (2005) allowed for the existence of public consumption in the collective model to 
show how this model allowed the analysis of welfare consequences of policies aimed 
at changing the distribution of power within the household, and how the observation 
of labor supplies and household demand for the public good allowed to identify 
individual welfare and the decision process. 
Extensions were made in several ways. One was to test the unitary and collective 
household labor supply models using various methods. Fortin and Lacroix (1997) 
postulated a nonlinear unrestricted household labor supply system and derived the set 
of parametric restrictions imposed by each model. Their results generally rejected the 
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income pooling restrictions embodied in the unitary model and the symmetry of 
cross-wage effects, while the collective model was not rejected for groups with no 
pre-school children. Vermeulen (2005) applied the two models to Dutch microdata 
and observed that the unitary model could be rej ected for couples but not for singles, 
while the collective model could not be rejected either way for the same sample. Chau 
et al. (2007) used Chinese data to test the collective model and rejected the hypothesis 
that distribution factors have no effect on household time allocation decisions, but 
could not reject restrictions implied by the collective model. 
Another direction was to estimate labor supply and intra-household allocations 
using the collective model. Browning et al. (1994) applied the collective model to a 
sample of Canadian couples with no children, and discovered that the allocations of 
expenditures depended significantly on relative incomes, ages and levels of lifetime 
wealth. Aronsson et al. (2001) estimated the intra-family distribution of income, 
individual demands for leisure, and household production from Swedish household 
data. Blundell et al. (2007) identified and estimated a collective labor supply model 
with discrete choices, censoring of hours, and non-participation in employment for 
married couples without children in the UK. Their estimated sharing rule 
demonstrated that male wages and employment possessed a strong influence on 
bargaining power within couples. Studies on female labor supply likewise applied the 
collective framework, such as those ofVermeulen (2006) and Donni (2007). 
Studies on China involve that of Li and Zax (2003), which drew on the collective 
framework to estimate labor supply in urban China and identified significant positive 
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compensated wage effects and negative income effects. Our focus, however, lies in 
intra-household allocation of labor and resources. The collective model is a path 
through which we can obtain the features of intra-household distribution. Thus, we 
can arrive at results which are not commonly included in the study of collective 
framework. 
Ill. Theoretical model and empirical specification 
Our empirical study is based on the framework of Apps and Rees (1996). Theoretical 
works such as Chiappori (1988, 1992 & 1997) only provide us with the characteristics 
of the collective model and restrictions that can be used to test its validity, rather than 
any concrete specification for estimating household labor supply. Majority of 
empirical studies were aimed at testing the collective model against the unitary model, 
while others focused on specific aspects such as marriage or female labor supply. 
Among these, the Apps and Rees model is the only one that has clearly define the cost 
function of household production and derived the implicit price of domestic good, 
which is essential for calculating individual production and expenditures of domestic 
good. And we can furthermore depict a detailed picture of how resources are allocated 
among spouses. 
For this study, we modified this model by changing selected demographic 
variables. Further, the method we adopted for estimation is different from that of Apps 
and Rees. 
The setting for the model is as follows: The household consists of individuals with 
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their own utility functions determined by their consumption of goods. The only 
assumption we made is that the allocation of time and resources among individuals 
achieves a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Three kinds of goods are defined: a market 
composite consumption good x, the price of which is unity; a domestically produced 
good y, with an endogenously determined price p *; and pure leisure z, whose 
prices are equal to individual market wage rates. 
Since we are concerned about the labor supply both in the market and at home, we 
only consider the working couple in a family, which refers to the couple of whom 
both are in the working age and at least one of them is working in the market. The 
selected samples adhere to this criterion. For each individual, we have the utility 
function in the following form: 
which is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly quasI-concave and twice 
differentiable. 
With exogenously given wage rates wi and non-wage incomes mi , the problem 
for each individual i is as follows: 
maxu j S.t. 
LXi::; L (WJi + mJ, i = 1,2 
L Yi = Y ::; h (tp t 2 ) , i = 1,2 
where Ij IS i 's labor supply in the market; t j is the time spent on housework to 
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produce domestic good; u~ is a reservation utility level of individual j; and h(,.) 
is the household production function, assumed to be strictly increasing, twice 
differentiable and concave. 
The underlying idea is that each individual i has a reservation utility level u? 
that must be weakly exceeded and attempts to maximize his own utility as long as this 
constraint is satisfied with the partner. We assume that u10 and u~ are differentiable 
functions of individual wage rates and non-Iabor incomes respectively. 
The solutions for this system provide functions of the exogenous variables wi ' 
m i and endogenous variable u~. Since u~ is a function of wi and m i and is 
unobservable, it is suppressed in the notations and the solutions are written as 
li (W1 , W 2 ' m1 , m2 )· The implicit price p * is likewise a function of the exogenous 
As Chiappori (1992) argued, decision making in the household could be seen as a 
two-stage process. The household's full income is initially distributed among family 
members, and then each individual maximizes his own utility subject to a budget 
constraint that restricts the value of demands for the market good, household good and 
leisure. This transforms individual demands and labor supplies as functions of the 
wage rates, the implicit price of the domestic good and the income share. The results 
generated from this method are equivalent to those of the previous problem, and a 
Pareto-efficiency could be reached as well. The advantage of the latter one is that it 
provides a feasible way to conduct empirical studies in the following steps. 
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Assume that the household production function IS linear homogeneous In the 
following form: 
C(Wp W 2 ,Y) = C(Wp w2 )Y 
where c(.) is the unit cost function. 
Since the market is clear and the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient, we have 
p* = c(wp w2 ) 
The only unobservable variable in the data is the implicit price of the domestic good 
p * , which can be obtained here from the cost production. 
The labor allocations to household production are given by the following: 
ti = (8c( W1 , W 2 ) / 8Wi )y = 1; (p * , w1 , W 2 ) 
Denoting the implicit share in household income of individual i at the 
equilibrium by s * , such that L s; = L (wiT + mi), the equilibrium household 
allocation is the solution to the following problem: 
This yields the solutions XJp*, wi,s;), ~(p*, Wi ,Si*)' and Zi(P*, Wi,Si*) . 
By the second theorem of welfare economics, we have the following identities: 
These identities offer the equations which can be estimated for empirical studies. 
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Assume that the household cost function is translog, i.e. 
lnc(wJ' w2) == a.(g ., 1I.)ln w. + 0.5a .. ln2 w. + a .· In w. ln w . I I r'1 I 11 I LJ I J 
where gi is a vector of demographic and personal characteristics, and J.1i IS an 
error term. We then arrive at the following: 
T == (c / w·Xa .(g ., 11 .)+ a·· In w. + a·· In w. )11) I I I I r'1 11 I LJ J .J' 
Since p * == C and the constant returns to scale assumption implies that 
p * Y == L WjI; , we have the following share equations for estimation: 
(w.T / '"" w.T) == a.(g., 11 .)+ a .. In w. + a .. In w . 
I I ~ I I I I r'1 11 I LJ J (1) 
Then the price of the domestic good can be computed as the exponent of the unit 
cost function: 
Here the demographic and education variables are entered as 
a;{gj' J.1J == a? + a; In agel + a: In age2 + aJ edul + at edu2 + a: In N + a: Dl + ai7 D2 
+ a~ D3 + a ~ D4 + a~o Fl + a~ J F2 + a~ 2 F3 + 11 . 
I I I I I r'l 
where N is the household size; Dl, D2, D3, and D4 are the numbers of 
children in the age categories 0-2, 3-4, 5-9, and 10-15 years, respectively; and Fl, 
F2, and F3 are the numbers of the elders in the age categories 55-64, 65-75, and 
above 75 years, respectively. 
On the consumption side, we adopted Deaton and Muellbauer's "almost ideal 
demand system" of preferences (1980). The indirect utility function for individual i 
takes the form 
where the price indexes Ai (-) and Bi (.) are given by 
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In Ai ( wi , P * ; d i , ei ) == a 0 + a ~ ( d ~ , e~ ) In wi + a ~ ( d ~ , e~ ) In p * + 0.5 Y zz In 2 Wi 
2 * * + O.5yyy In p + Yzy In wi lnp 
i i 
Y yy ' Yzy , f3~ and f3~ are the parameters; d ~ IS a 
vector of demographic variables; and e~ is the stochastic component of preferences 
for k == z, Y, x . 




where i == 1,2. S~ denotes the share of individual i 's consumption of k in his 
share of household income, i.e., S~ == WiZi / s;, S~ == P * Yi / s;, and S~ == Xi / s;. The 
intercept coefficients incorporating demo graphics and the stochastic term are 
specified as 
for k == z, y , x and i == 1,2, where D5 is the number of children in the ages of 0-4 
years, and F 4 is the number of the elders above 55 years. 
The data available for estimation of this model include information on wage rates, 
non-Iabor incomes, labor supplies in the market, and time allocations for domestic 
work. Since we lack the data on individual consumptions of Yi and Xi ' we estimate 
the male and female parameters in demands for domestic good are identical. 
Moreover, because the data do not contain information on s * terms, they are merely 
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assumed to be equal to one's full income, that is, Si* = WiT + mi . 
Apps and Rees (1996) applied the maximum likelihood method to estimate the 
demand equation system. Our approach, on the other hand, will not alter the 
parameters to be estimated, but instead change the equations into linear ones to arrive 
at feasible linear estimations. We adopted an approximation of Ai as presented by 
and then InA i* = S~ In Wi + Sy lnp* . Thus, equations (2), (3), and (4) can be written as 
follows: 
Si - (a iO -p ln~) +a il D5 + a i2 D3+ai3 D4+ai4 F4+a is lnN + ri In W k - k k 'f/ k k k k k kz i 
+ r~ In p * + p~ In(s; / Ai*) 
Substituting (a!O - Pk InrjJ) by a~i, the estimation equations are given by 
Finally, constraints on the parameters have been made: the adding up restrictions that 
La! = 1, L r~ = 0 and L p~ = 0; homogeneity and symmetry, that is, L r~k = 0, 
k k k k 
i r i . rl - r2 pI - p2 a ik - a jk all £or k}· - z y x and z· 1 2 r kj = jk' kj - kj' k - k' y - y ' , - , , = , . 
IV. Data and empirical results 
Our data are obtained from China Household Nutrition Survey (CRNS), an ongoing 
international collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center at the 
University of North Carolina and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety 
at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The survey covered nine 
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provinces of China with seven panels for the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004 and 2006. 
The data files contain all the information that we need on the basic conditions of 
the households, such as the household size, each individual's gender, age, years of 
formal education, employment status, time of work in the market and at home, 
monthly wage, income from sources other than wage, and so on. As to the time of 
work in the labor market, respondents were asked how many months they worked in 
the previous year, averagely how many weeks they worked per month, how many 
days they worked per week, and how many hours they worked per day. For the time 
of work at home, each individual was asked about the average hours per week that he 
spent on buying food, preparing food, washing clothes, cleaning house, and caring for 
children. In the 1989 wave, they were also asked about average hours of caring for old 
parents. This is the most valuable information that the CRNS data contain, as it is the 
key for this study, and few other surveys on China collected such information. Apart 
from wage income, individuals also reported cash bonus, subsidies, rental income, 
pensions, and in-kind income as well. 
Two waves, 1989 and 2006, were selected as these were the earliest and latest 
years, allowing us to cover as long a time span as possible. The 1997 wave was 
likewise included as it fell roughly in the middle of this period. Meanwhile, it was a 
significant year during the economic transition. The two-day weekend system was 
implemented in May 1995, and its effect might be tangible in 1997 since collected 
data included information for the year 1996. Moreover, 1997 marked the beginning of 
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a new round of reform for the SOEs when a large number of workers were laid off, 
most among whom were middle-aged women. The effect of the reform may be 
revealed by a shift in the pattern of female labor supply. 
The labor markets in Chinese rural areas are imperfect and market work is 
difficult to separate from housework in rural households; hence, our research merely 
covers urban households. We selected samples of urban households with only one 
generation employed, with the age ranging from 20 to 64 years (households with two 
generations employed were excluded; at least one spouse should be working in the 
labor market, that is, and households with both partners unemployed were excluded 
from the sample). Young children under 15 years and old parents (above 55 years if 
they are not the "chosen couple") were considered as dependents. 
Adding up the average hours of work at home per week yields one's time for 
housework. To keep the unit of time consistent, we take the average hours of work per 
week in the labor market, which is the product of average working hours per day and 
average working days per week, as the indicator of one's labor supply in the market. 
For those who did not work for twelve months per year or four weeks per month, this 
number is calculated by dividing the total hours of work per year by his actual weeks 
of working. Leisure time is the difference between total available time, which is 
sixteen hours per day by seven days per week, and the weekly hours of work in the 
market and at home, which is a typical way when computing leisure. The hourly wage 
rate yields from dividing one's "actual monthly wage" by his average working hours 
per month, where the "actual monthly wage" is the sum of nominal monthly wage and 
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other labor income such as cash bonus. For those unemployed the wage rates are 
calculated as the average wages of other people in the same community of the same 
age and with the same educational level. Non-Iabor incomes such as rental income 
and subsidies are all considered as "other income" and a monthly average is taken. All 
monetary variables are calculated in 2006 RMB, converted according to different 
inflation rates in each province. 
Table 4.1 is a summary of the data set. In our data, change in household size was 
not so sharp as the national survey revealed. However, the real wage rates increased 
significantly while the wage gap between men and women widened as well. In 1989, 
these were almost equal; in 2006, however, the average wage of men was over 1.5 
times greater than that of women. This is consistent with the finding of Liu et al. 
(2001). 
Although the reasons for this widening gap is not investigated in this study, data 
offers evidence for Liu et al. 's (2001) argument that marketization is a possible 
impetus. Labor supply in the market dropped for both men and women, while the 
latter dropped much more quickly, especially from 1997 to 2006. This is quite natural 
as drastic measures were taken as part of the Ninth Five-Year Plan from 1996 to 2000; 
the plan was geared toward improving SOEs' efficiency after millions of workers 
were laid off in urban China. 
Among the laid-off workers, majority were middle-aged women for whom finding 
new employment was more difficult compared to other groups. The phenomena in the 
data obtained in this study support this argument. They are likewise consistent with 
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statistical data5, which reflect a sudden drop in the numbers of workers in state-owned 
and collective sectors in 1998, and a continuous decrease of these two numbers. The 
total number of workers decreased by 22% from 1997 to 2007, to which the decrease 
of workers in the SOEs and the collectively-owned enterprises contributed most, with 
the former decreasing by 30% and the latter by 76%. The decline in labor force 
participation in our data is likely a result of environmental transformation rather than 
voluntary choice. 
In the case of domestic work, time spent by men on housework displayed a big 
jump in the 1997 wave, and subsequently fell in the 2006 wave to a level slightly 
lower than that in the 1989 wave. This is possibly the consequence of "external 
shock", specifically the two-day weekend implemented in 1995 which broke the 
equilibrium between men and women. As people adjusted to the new system, they 
arrived at a new equilibrium similar to the previous one. Women's supply of 
household labor increased steadily across the three waves, though not at a high rate. A 
small jump is likewise found in the 1997 wave, which can be similarly explained as 
the fluctuation of men's supply of household labor. 
Our data demonstrate a feature of Chinese households which is quite different 
from Western households, in which the number of overall hours of domestic labor 
continued to decline since the 1960s, mainly because of dramatic declines among 
women as Bianchi et al. (2000) explained. 
5 See Appendix Table 3 for details. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of data 
Variables 
Observations of households 
Observations of individuals 




Hourly wage rate 
Hours of market work per week 
Hours of housework per week 




Hourly wage rate 
Hours of market work per week 
Hours of housework per week 















































Table 4.1 Summary of data (Continued) 
Variables 
Household size 
Number of children 
Dl: 0-2 years 
D2: 3-4 years 
D3: 5-9 years 
D4: 10-15 years 
Number of elders 
Fl: 55-64 years 
F2: 65-75 years 





























Table 4.2 illustrates the estimates of equation (1), which is the production side. 
The production side measures how each factor affects the time spent by men on 
domestic production. The ages of men and women, men's educational level, the 
numbers of young children within the age categories of 0-2 years and 10-15 years, 
and the numbers of elders within the age categories of 55-64 years and 65-75 years do 
not demonstrate continuous effects on men's share of housework. Women's 
educational level, the numbers of young children within the age categories of 3-4 
years and 5-9 years, and the number of elders within the age category of 75 years and 
above demonstrate positive effects, while household size creates a negative effect. 
However, none of these are significant. 
The only variable that remains statistically significant across the three waves is the 
average wage rates of both partners. Men are predisposed to undertaking more 
domestic work as their relative wage increases, that is, either their own wage 
Increases or their spouse's wage decreases. The same result can be deduced for 
women. Although counter-intuitive, a possible explanation for this phenomenon is 
that domestic work is a kind of "leisure" enjoyed by people. For example, shopping 
for food can be viewed as a recreation, which is especially true for women. Caring for 
children is a precious time for parents to communicate with their children and express 
their affections. This result is rather interesting, as the original intention to incorporate 
household production into the collective model of labor supply is to separate domestic 
work from leisure because they are different activities, while our result shows some 
common features between these two activities. 
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Table 4.2 Parameter Estimates on the Production Side 
Coefficients 
Parameters 
1989 wave 1997 wave 2006 wave 
0.5853* 0.3134 -0.4971 
0 a] 
(0.3125) (0.3208) (0.4198) 
0.2966 -0.1241 0.4514* 
a; (inage1) 
(0.1817) (0.1970) (0.2336) 
-0.3826** 0.1478 -0.2394 
a]2 (in age2) 
(0.1851) (0.1964) (0.2250) 
0.0011 0.0002 -0.0091 
a~(edu1) 
(0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0056) 
0.0043 0.0033 0.0086 
a: (edu2) 
(0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0056) 
-0.0233 -0.0542 -0.0332 
a~ (in 1"1) 
(0.0794) (0.0798) (0.0839) 
0.0273 0.1256* 0.0569 
a]6(D1) 
(0.0579) (0.0708) (0.1071) 
0.0058 -0.0114 0.0482 
a; (D2) 
(0.0497) (0.0614) (0.0758) 
0.0192 0.0183 0.0180 
a~ (D3) 
(0.0351 ) (0.0383) (0.0549) 
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Table 4.2 Parameter Estimates on the Production Side (Continued) 
Coefficients 
Parameters 
1989 wave 1997 wave 2006 wave 
0.0050 -0.0221 0.0110 
a~(D4) 
(0.0283) (0.0286) (0.0409) 
-0.0208 0.0317 0.0694* 
all o (F1) 
(0.0400) (0.0405) (0.0372) 
-0.0201 -0.0041 0.1414 *** 
a: I (F2) 
(0.0380) (0.0407) (0.0457) 
0.1264** 0.0716 0.1223** 
a l
12 (F3) 
(0.0606) (0.0587) (0.0592) 
0.0953*** 0.1424*** 0.0849*** 
all = a22 = -a12 = -a21 
(0.0289) (0.0216) (0.0189) 
Note: Std. Err. in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 0.1, 0.05 
and 0.01, respecti vel y. 
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Table 4.3 shows the estimates of equations (5), (6), and (7), which is the demand 
side. The results describe the way individuals decide on the consumption of goods and 
leisure. The elderly did not show continuous effects on either men or women's share 
of leisure and domestic good in their consumption. The youngest group of children 
between 0-4 years created a significant negative effect on both parents' leisure time, 
while the effects of older groups of children were ambiguous for fathers and negative 
for mothers. It is implied that when children are small and require more care, both 
parents are compelled to sacrifice leisure to look after them. As the children grow 
older, the task falls on the mother, suggesting that women assume a greater degree of 
responsibility in raising children. 
An unusual phenomenon appeared in 1997 and 2006 waves, indicating that the 
youngest group of children could increase their parents' consumption of domestic 
goods. A possible interpretation is that domestic good is perceived as a "public" good 
in the household. For example, a spouse can freely enjoy services such as cooking and 
cleaning, which are originally intended for the children. As a result, consumption of 
domestic goods is increased. Household size showed a constant negative effect on 
female leisure, suggesting that women would accomplish more housework as families 
grow larger. 
The effects of wage rates and the price of domestic good are constantly significant. 
Both men and women increase their leisure time as their own wage rates increase or 
as the domestic good price decreases. Consumption of domestic goods increases as its 
price goes up or as wages decline. 
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Table 4.3 Parameter Estimates on the Demand Side 
Coefficients 
Parameters 
1989 wave 1997 wave 2006 wave 




(0.1149) (0.1050) (0.0666) 
-0.0083 -0.0708*** -0.0597*** 
a !l(DS) 
(0.0111) (0.0135) (0.0166) 
0.0010* -0.0158 -0.0213 
a !2 (D3) 
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0139) 
0.0085 -0.0150* -0.0124 
a !3 (D4) 
(0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0105) 
0.0182** 
-0.0051 -0.0048 
a !4 (F4) 
(0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0079) 
-0.0319 0.0246 -0.0405* 
a !5 (lnN) 
(0.0230) (0.0235) (0.0225) 
1.9697*** 3.8272*** 3.2649*** 
a, 20 
z 
(0.1149) (0.1044) (0.0706) 
-0.0231 * -0.0964*** -0.0498** 
a~ l (DS) 
(0.0127) (0.0153) (0.0224) 
-0.0025 -0.0127 -0.0425 ** 
a~2 (D3) 
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0188) 
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Table 4.3 Parameter Estimates on the Demand Side (Continued 1) 
Coefficients 
Parameters 
1989 wave 1997 wave 2006 wave 
-0.0035 -0.0179* -0.0181 
a :
3(D4) 
(0.0103) (0.0094) (0.0141) 
0.0391 *** 0.0145 -0.0222** 
a :
4(F4) 
(0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0106) 
-0.0346 -0.0062 -0.0056 
a :
5 (In N) 
(0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0302) 
0.5816*** 0.3012*** 0.1516*** 
a ll o = a/ 2O y y 
(0.0720) (0.1064) (0.0720) 
-0.0024 0.0820*** 0.0488*** 
all = a 21 (DS) y y 
(0.0067) (0.0103) (0.0109) 
-0.0024 0.0170** 0.0164* 
a~2 = a :2(D3) 
(0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0091) 
-0.0026 0.0100 0.0023 
a 13 = a 23 (D4) y y 
(0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0069) 
-0.0296*** 0.0009 0.0018 
a 14 = a 24 (F 4) 
y y 
(0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0052) 




25 (In N) y y 
(0.0139) (0.0180) (0.0147) 
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Table 4.3 Parameter Estimates on the Demand Side (Continued 2) 
Coefficients 
Parameters 
1989 wave 1997 wave 2006 wave 
0.1544*** 0.2844*** 0.1798*** 
1 2 
Yzz = Yzz 
(0.0142) (0.0098) (0.0062) 
0.0549*** 0.0830*** 0.0425*** 
1 2 
Yyy = Yyy 
(0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0056) 
-0.0119 -0.0669*** -0.0330*** 
1 2 1 2 
Y zy = Y zy = Y yz = Y yz 
(0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0049) 
-0.2472*** -0.5424*** -0.4328*** 
(3 ~= (3~ 
(0.0178) (0.0158) (0.0093) 
-0.0755*** 
-0.0249 -0.0135* 
(3~ = (3: 
(0.0112) (0.0162) (0.0080) 
Note: Std. Err. in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 0.1, 0.05 
and 0.01, respectively. 
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Finally, Table 4.4 provides an overall picture of the intra-household allocation of 
labor supply and consumptions. This table conveys information on the internal 
sharing of Chinese urban households and its changes over time. In general, men work 
more in the market while women spend more time at home. As to market work, shares 
of men and women remained stable from 1989 to 1997, while women's share of work 
suddenly dropped in 2006. This drastic shift may be attributed to the return of the 
traditional value, and women voluntarily chose to leave the labor market and spend 
more time at home. It may likewise be the consequence of the economic reform, 
which drove more women out of the market. Further analysis may be conducted to 
verify these hypotheses. The shift of market work from women to men suggests that 
the gender division of labor has become more clear-cut. 
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Table 4.4 Intra-household Allocation of Labor and Consumptions 
Variable means 
Share of market work 
Share of household work 
Hours of market work per year 
(share in total available time) 
Hours of household work per year 
(share in total available time) 
Hours of leisure per year 
(share in total available time) 
Market good expenditure per year 
(share in one's full income) 
Domestic good expenditure per year 
(share in one's full income) 
Leisure expenditure per year 
(share in one's full income) 




































































































Table 4.4 Intra-household Allocation of Labor and Consumptions(Continued) 
1989 wave 1997 wave 2006 wave 
Variable means 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Contribution of market good per year 217.35 -217.35 369.94 -369.94 1598.48 -1596.67 
Contribution of domestic good per year -240.91 233.77 -537.33 505.38 -2075.48 2355.89 
Net contribution per year -23.56 16.42 -167.39 135.44 -477.00 759.23 
Note: 
1. Share of market work = a spouse's hours of market work per year / the couple's 
total hours of market work per year. Share of household work is calculated in the 
same way. 
2. Individual total available time per year equals 16*360 = 5760 hours. 
3. Contribution of market good is the difference between production of market good 
(here equal to the summation of the individual's wage income and other income) and 
expenditure of market good. A minus sign means that the expenditure exceeds the 
production, while a positive one means the opposite. Contribution of domestic good is 
calculated in the same way. 
4. Net contribution is the sum of contributions to market good and domestic good. 
5. All monetary terms are calculated in 2006 RMB. 
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In terms of expenditure, the amount of market good and domestic good that men 
consumed was slightly less than that of women in 1989. However, since 1997 this 
amount began to exceed that of women, and the difference increased significantly in 
2006. 
In terms of leisure, men's consumption was higher than women, and the gap 
continuously increased through the years. This offers the evidence that overall gender 
inequality in the intra-household allocation of expenditures has expanded. The share 
of expenditures on leisure rapidly rose for both men and women as income increased, 
while the share of market good dropped down. This trend is natural as the Chinese 
began to rise above poverty in late 1980s. At the time a big portion of the income was 
allocated for basic needs such as food and clothing. Since these are all fixed demands, 
the proportion tended to fall as income grew rapidly and people desired more leisure 
and entertainment. Our findings may be regarded as evidence for Engel's Law. 
Meanwhile, the share of expenditures on domestic good did not reveal any 
continuous trend, perhaps because of "external shock". After a sudden jump, these 
shares in the 2006 wave dropped to the 1989 level, implying that the demands for 
domestic good are quite stable. 
The contributions of market good and domestic good show that men contribute 
market good and receive domestic good, while women act in the opposite way. It 
supports the exchange hypothesis that men work more in the market and exchange 
market good with women for domestic good. The intra-household exchange remained 
the same over the last two decades, and the amount of exchange continued to increase. 
This suggests that the roles of men and women have become more distinct. The net 
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contribution measures how much one gives to or receives from the household. The 
results show that men obviously provided less and received more, while women 
contributed more to their families and enjoyed less interest. The gender differences 
became even larger after thirty years of reform and opening-up. 
Traditionally, Chinese families believed that "men should handle external matters, 
while women look after the home". The participation rate of women in the labor force 
therefore remained low until 1949, when the new China was founded and women 
were encouraged to work outside the home. Female workers were almost equal to 
men either in wages or in numbers. However, as inequality in wages becomes larger 
and household incomes grow quickly in recent years, more and more women opt for 
domestic work and become full-time housewives. Our findings may serve as evidence 
for the return of traditional ideology in different gender social roles. However, as 
mentioned above, the gender division of work may be caused by the drastic lay-offs 
and women being forced to quit their jobs in higher levels than men. The results 
shown in our studies are a mixed consequence of various reasons, and further research 
is required to discover the dominant reason. We can only present the fact that in 
today's Chinese society, women remain to be more home-oriented than men and 
assume more responsibilities in caring for their families. 
From a world perspective, similar results can be observed in other countries. For 
example, Davis and Greenstein (2006) described the division of household labor 
among married couples in 13 nations, and learned that husbands were likely to 
perform at least half of domestic labor in the households where the wife was 
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employed outside the home, or when wives' education was on a par with or exceeded 
that of their husbands. They likewise observed significant differences in the division 
of domestic labor based upon respondents' nations of residence, which is supported 
by Kalleberg and Rosenfeld (1990) and Lewin-Epstein et al. (2006). Ideology is found 
to be an important determinant of the division of work in many countries. However, 
we can not perform the same analysis on China households because of the lack of data. 
Among all the factors examined, wages are the most significant, influencing the labor 
supply of households and the internal distribution, and perhaps suggesting that the 
Chinese are still so poor that all their decisions are largely determined by how much 
money they earn. 
v. Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimated a household labor supply model in the collective 
framework using data from urban China. The estimation results indicated how 
individuals distribute labor supply between market work and domestic work, and how 
the resources are allocated within the household. Wages emerged as the most 
important determinant of individual labor supplies to domestic work and individual 
allocations of consumption. Our findings suggest that different gender roles still exist 
in China. In general, the division of work between men and women is quite clear-cut 
that men work more in the market while women work more at home. 
There are several ways to extend this study. First, one of the basic assumptions in 
this study is continuous labor supply, which may not be true as decisions to participate 
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in the labor market are discrete. Donni (2003) and Blundell et al. (2007) incorporated 
non-participation in the collective model to test restrictions on the collective labor 
supply. However, household production was not taken into account in their framework. 
Therefore, a possible extension is to consider non-participation in a collective model 
with household production. 
To conduct such research, using time-series data instead of cross-sectional data 
has a special advantage. Time-series data contain relatively sufficient information on 
the household's behavioral patterns, especially the decision point of participation or 
non-participation. With such information we will be able to examine the effect of 
wages and demographic variables on the decision making process, which is not 
involved in this study. 
Second, the effect of other factors such as ideology can be examined. Ideology 
refers to how a person identifies himself or herself in terms of marital and family roles. 
The literature suggests that gender ideology is related to the division of labor in the 
home (Stafford et al. 1977; Ross, 1987; Greenstein, 1996). To study this issue, 
specific information must be collected. For example, in Greenstein's (1996 & 2000) 
works, he used data from National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). In 
this survey, respondents were asked to how much they agreed with the four items: "It 
is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care 
of the home and family", "preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother is 
employed", "parents should encourage just as much independence from their 
daughters as in their sons", and "if a husband and wife both work full-time, they 
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should share housework tasks equally". The item sconng scales were used as 
indicators of gender ideologies. In our study, ideology is an important explanation that 
we offered for gender differentials. Unfortunately, we cannot provide evidence as 
such information is not contained in the eRNS data. Deeper research should be 
conducted using more sufficient data sets. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Wage and Price Indices in Urban China 
Year Average Nominal Average Real CPI Retail Price Wage Index Wage Index Index 
1978 100 100 100 100 
1979 108.6 106.6 101.9 104.4 
1980 123.9 113.2 109.5 112.9 
1981 125.5 111.9 112.2 116 
1982 129.8 113.4 114.4 118.4 
1983 134.3 115.1 116.7 120.6 
1984 158.4 132.1 119.9 123.7 
1985 186.7 139 134.2 138.7 
1986 216.2 150.4 143.6 148.5 
1987 237.4 151.9 156.2 162 
1988 284.2 150.7 188.5 196.5 
1989 314.9 143.5 219.2 227.9 
1990 348.3 156.7 222 228.4 
1991 380.7 162.9 233.3 238.6 
1992 441.2 173.8 253.4 257 
1993 548.4 186.1 294.2 293.5 
1994 738.1 200.4 367.8 354.8 
1995 894.6 208 429.6 402.7 
1996 1010 215.9 467.4 426.1 
1997 1052.4 218.3 481.9 429.5 
1998 1121.9 234 479 418.3 
1999 1252 264.6 472.8 405.8 
2000 1406 294.7 476.6 399.7 
2001 1631 339.5 479.9 395.3 
2002 1864.2 391.9 475.1 389.4 
2003 2106.6 438.9 479.4 387.8 
2004 2403.6 484.8 495.2 396 
2005 2761.8 548.1 503.1 397.9 
2006 3159.5 617.7 510.6 401.5 
2007 3740.8 701.7 533.6 414.8 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, "China Statistical Yearbook" 
(various years). 
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Table 2. Basic Conditions of Urban Households in China 
Number of Average Average Number of Number of 
Year Households Household Employed Persons Dependents per 
Surveyed Size per Household Employee 
1985 24338 3.89 2.15 0.81 
1986 31126 3.82 2.12 0.8 
1987 32855 3.74 2.09 0.79 
1988 31945 3.63 2.03 0.79 
1989 35235 3.55 2 0.78 
1990 35660 3.5 1.98 0.77 
1991 36730 3.43 1.96 0.75 
1992 36290 3.37 1.95 0.73 
1993 35390 3.31 1.92 0.72 
1994 34940 3.28 1.88 0.74 
1995 35520 3.23 1.87 0.73 
1996 36370 3.2 1.86 0.72 
1997 37890 3.19 1.83 0.74 
1998 39080 3.16 1.8 0.75 
1999 40044 3.14 1.77 0.77 
2000 42220 3.13 1.68 0.86 
2001 43840 3.1 1.65 0.88 
2002 45317 3.04 1.58 0.92 
2003 48028 3.01 1.58 0.91 
2004 50430 2.98 1.56 0.91 
2005 54496 2.96 1.51 0.96 
2006 56094 2.95 1.53 0.93 
2007 59305 2.91 1.54 0.89 
2008 64684 2.9 1.5 1 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, "China Labour Statistical 
Yearbook" (various years). 
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Table 3. Numbers of workers and percentages in three sectors in urban China 
State- Collec- Percentage Percentage Percentage Other of of 
Year Total owned tive of other 
sector State-owned collective 
sector sector sector 
sector sector 
1984 11890 8637 3216 37 72.6 27.0 0.3 
1985 12358 8990 3324 44 72.7 26.9 0.4 
1986 12809 9333 3421 55 72.9 26.7 0.4 
1987 13214 9654 3488 72 73.1 26.4 0.5 
1988 13608 9984 3527 97 73.4 25.9 0.7 
1989 13742 10108 3502 132 73.5 25.5 1.0 
1990 14059 10346 3549 164 73.6 25.2 1.2 
1991 14508 10664 3628 216 73.5 25.0 1.5 
1992 14792 10889 3621 282 73.6 24.5 1.9 
1993 14849 10920 3393 536 73.5 22.9 3.6 
1994 14849 10890 3211 747 73.3 21.6 5.0 
1995 14908 10955 3076 877 73.5 20.6 5.9 
1996 14845 10949 2954 942 73.8 19.9 6.3 
1997 14668 10766 2817 1085 73.4 19.2 7.4 
1998 12337 8809 1900 1628 71.4 15.4 13.2 
1999 11773 8336 1652 1785 70.8 14.0 15.2 
2000 11259 7878 1447 1935 70.0 12.9 17.2 
2001 10792 7409 1241 2142 68.7 11.5 19.8 
2002 10558 6924 1071 2563 65.6 10.1 24.3 
2003 10492 6621 951 2920 63.1 9.1 27.8 
2004 10576 6438 851 3287 60.9 8.0 3l.1 
2005 10850 6232 769 3849 57.4 7.1 35.5 
2006 11160 6170 726 4264 55.3 6.5 38.2 
2007 11427 6148 684 4595 53.8 6.0 40.2 




- Alenezi, M. and Walden, M. L. (2004). A New Look at Husbands' and Wives' Time 
Allocation. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(1),81- 106. 
- Alvarez, B. and Miles, D. (2003). Gender effect on housework allocation: Evidence 
from Spanish two-earner couples. Journal of Population Economics, 16,227-242. 
- Appleton, S., Knight, 1., Song, L. and Xia, Q. (2004). Contrasting Paradigms: 
Segmentation and Competitiveness in the Fonnation of the Chinese Labour Market. 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2(3), 185-205. 
- Apps, P. F. and Rees, R. (1988). Taxation and the household. Journal of Public 
Economics, 35, 155-169. 
- Apps, P. F. and Rees, R. (1996). Labour supply, household production and 
intra-family welfare distribution. Journal of Public Economics, 60,199-219. 
- Apps, P. F. and Rees, R. (1997). Collective labor supply and household production. 
Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 178-190. 
- Aronsson, T., Daunfeldt, S. -0. and Wikstrom, M. (2001). Estimating intrahousehold 
allocation in a collective model with household production. Journal of Population 
Economics, 14, 569-584. 
- Barnett, R. C. and Baruch, G. K. (1987). Detenninants of Fathers' Participation in 
Family Work. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 49(1), 29-40. 
- Bauer, J., Wang, F., Riley, N. E. and Zhao, X. (1992). Gender Inequality in Urban 
China: Education and Employment. Modern China, 18(3),333-370. 
- Becker, G. S. (1965). A Theory of Allocation of Time. Economic Journal, 75, 
493-517. 
- Berardo, D. H., Shehan, C. L. and Leslie, G. R. (1987). A Residue of Tradition: Jobs, 
Careers, and Spouses' Time in Housework. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 49(2), 
381- 390. 
- Bergmann, B. R., Devine, J. R., Gordon, P., Reedy, D., Sage, L. and Wise, C. (1980). 
The Effect of Wives' Labor Force Partcipation on Inequality in the Distribution of 
Family Income. Journal of Human Resources, 15(3),452-455. 
- Betson, D and Gaag, J. (1984). Working Married Women and the Distribution of 
Income. Journal of Hum an Resources, 19(4),532-543. 
- Bianchi, S. M., Milkie, M. A., Sayer, L.C. and Robinson, J. P. (2000). Is Anyone 
Doing t~e Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor. Social 
Forces, 79(1), 191-228. 
- Bird, G. W., Bird, G. A. and Scruggs, M. (1984). Determinants of Family Task 
Sharing: A Study of Husbands and Wives. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 46(2), 
345-355. 
- Bishop, J. A., Luo, F. and Wang, F. (2005). Economic transition, gender bias, and the 
distribution of earnings in China. Economics of Transition, 13(2),239- 259. 
- Blair, S. L. and Lichter, D. T. (1991). Measuring the Division of Household Labor: 
Gender Segregation of Housework Among American Couples. Journal of Family 
Issues, 12(1),91-113. 
- Blau, F. D. and Kahn, L. M. (2006). Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of 
49 
Married Women: 1980-2000. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2180. 
- Bloemen, H. G. and Stancanelli, E. G. F. (2008). How Do Parents Allocate Time? 
The Effects of Wages and Income. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3679. 
- Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., Fink, G. and Finley, J. E. (2007). Fertility, Female Labor 
Force Participation, and the Demographic Dividend. NBER Working Paper No. 
13583. 
- Blundell, R., Browning, M. and Meghir, C. (1994). Consumer Demand and the 
Life-Cycle Allocation of Household Expenditures. Review of Economic Studies, 61(1), 
57-80. 
- Blundell, R., Chiappori, P. -A. and Meghir, C. (2005). Collective Labour Supply 
with Children. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 1277-1306. 
- Blundell, R., Chiappori, P. -A., Magnac, T. and Meghir, C. (2007). Collective 
Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Non-Participation. Review of Economic Studies, 74, 
417-445. 
- Blundell, R. and Macurdy, T. (1999). Labor supply: A review of alternative 
approaches. Handbook of Labor Economics (Volume 3), Chapter 27, 1559-1695, 
Elsevier. 
- Bonke, J., Deding, M., Lausten, M. and Stratton, L. S. (2007). Intrahousehold 
Specialization in Housework in the United States and Denmark. IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 2777. 
- Brines, J. (1994). Economic Dependency, Gender, and the Division of Labor at 
Home. American Journal of Sociology, 100(3), 652-688. 
- Browning, M., Bourguignon, F., Chiappori, P. -A. and Lechene, V. (1994). Incomes 
and Outcomes: A Structural Model and Some Evidence from French Data. Journal of 
Political Economy, 102, 1067-1096. 
- Browning, M. and Chiappori, P. -A. (1998). Efficient intra-household allocations: A 
general characterisation and empirical tests. Econometrica, 66(6), 1241-1278. 
- Bryant, J., Jacobsen, V., Bell, M. and Garrett, D. (2004). Labour Force Participation 
and GDP in New Zealand. Treasury Working Paper Series from New Zealand 
Treasury 04/07. 
- Cai, F., Park, A. and Zhao, Y. (2008). The Chinese Labor Market in the Reform Era. 
in China's Great Economic Transformation, by Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, 
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6. 
- Chau, _T. W., Li, H., Liu, P. W. and Zhang, J. (2007). Testing the collective model of 
household labor supply: Evidence from China. China Economic Review, 18, 389-402. 
- Chen, F. (2005). Employment Transitions and the Household Division of Labor in 
China. Social Forces, 84(2), 831-851. 
- Chi, W. and Li, B. (2007). Glass Ceiling or Sticky Floor? Examining the Gender Pay 
Gap across the Wage Distribution in Urban China, 1987-2004. MPRA Paper No. 
3544. 
- Chiappori, P. -A. (1988). Rational Household Labor Supply. Econometrica, 56, 
63-89. 
- Chiappori, P. -A. (1992). Collective Labor Supply and Welfare. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100,437-467. 
50 
- Chiappori, P. -A. (1997). Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of 
Labor Supply. Journal of Political Economy, 105, 191-209. 
- Chiappori, P.-A., Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G. (2002). Marriage Market, Divorce 
Legislation and Household Labor Supply. Journal of Political Economy, 110, 37-72. 
- Clark, R., Ramsbey, T. W. and Adler, E. S. (1991). Culture, Gender, and Labor Force 
Participation: A Cross-National Study. Gender and Society, 5(1),47-66. 
- Cohen, P. N. (2004). The Gender Division of Labor: "Keeping House" and 
Occupational Segregation in the United States. Gender and Society, 18 (2), 239-252. 
- Connelly, R. (1992). The Effect of Child Care Costs on Married Women's Labor 
Force Participation. Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(1),83-90. 
- Coverman, S. (1985). Explaining Husbands' Participation in Domestic Labor. 
Sociological Quarterly, 26(1),81-97. 
- Danziger, S. (1980). Do Working Wives Increase Family Income Inequality? 
Journal of Human Resources, 15(3),444--451. 
- Davis, S. N. and Greenstein, T. N. (2004). Cross-National Variations in the Division 
of Household Labor. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66, 1260-1271. 
- Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980). An almost ideal demand system. American 
Economic Review, 70, 312-326. 
- Demurger, S., Fournier, M. and Chen, Y. (2007). The Evolution of Gender Earnings 
Gaps and Discrimination in Urban China, 1988-95. The Developing Economies, 45(1), 
97-121. 
- Demurger, S., Fournier, M., Shi, L. and Zhong, W. (2006). Economic liberalization 
with rising segmentation on China's urban labor market. Society for the Study of 
Economic Inequality Working Paper No. 46. 
- Dong, X. -Y. and Bowles, P. (2002). Segmentation and Discrimination in China's 
Emerging Industrial Labor Market. China Economic Review, 13, 170-196. 
- Donni, O. (2003). Collective Household Labor Supply: Nonparticipation and 
Income Taxation. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1179-1198. 
- Eckstein, Z. and Wolpin, K. I. (1989). Dynamic Labour Force Participation of 
Married Women and Endogenous Work Experience. Review of Economic Studies, 
56(3), 375-390. 
- Ericksen, J. A., Yancey, W. L. and Ericksen, E. P. (1979). The Division of Family 
Roles. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 41(2),301-313. 
- Farka~, G. (1976). Education, Wage Rates, and the Division of Labor between 
Husband and Wife. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 8(3),473-483. 
- Fan, C. C. (2002). The Elite, the Natives, and the Outsiders: Migration and Labor 
Market Segmentation in Urban China. Annals of Association of American 
Geographers, 92(1), 103-124. 
- Fan, C. C. (2003). Rural-urban migration and gender division of labor in transitional 
China. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(1), 24-47. 
- Ferber, M. A. (1982). Labor Market Participation of Young Married Women: Causes 
and Effects. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 44(2), 457--468. 
- Fernandez, R. (2007). Culture as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force 
Participation over a Century. NBER Working Paper No. 13373. 
51 
- Ferree, M. M. (1991). The Gender Division of Labor in Two-Earner Marriages: 
Dimensions of Variability and Change. Journal of Family Issues, 12, 158-180. 
- Fleisher, B. M. and Rhodes, G. (1976). Unemployment and the Labor Force 
Participation of Married Men and Women: A Simultaneous Model. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 58(4), 398-406. 
- Fleisher, B. M. and Rhodes, G. (1979). Fertility, Women's Wage Rates, and Labor 
Supply. American Economic Review, 69(1), 14-24. 
- Fleisher, B. M. and Yang, D. T. (2003). China's Labor Market. Conference paper for 
Conference on "China's Market Refonns" organized by Stanford Center for 
International Development, Stanford University. 
- Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G. (1997). A Test of Neoclassical and Collective Models of 
Household Labor Supply. Economic Journal, 107,933-955. 
- Fox, K. D. and Nickols, S. Y. (1983). The Time Crunch: Wife's Employment and 
Family Work. Journal of Family Issues, 4, 61-82. 
- Fuwa, M. (2004). Macro-Level Gender Inequality and the Division of Household 
Labor in 22 Countries. American Sociological Review, 69(6), 751-767. 
- Gerner, J. L. and Zick, C. D. (1983). Time Allocation Decisions In Two-Parent. 
Families Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 12, 145-158. 
- Gershuny, J. and Robinson, J. P. (1988). Historical Changes in the Household 
Division of Labor. Demography, 25(4),537-552. 
- Giles, J., Park, A. and Cai, F. (2006). How has Economic Restructuring Affected 
China's Urban Workers? China Quarterly, 185,61-95. 
- Goldin, C. (1989). Life-Cycle Labor-Force Participation of Married Women: 
Historical Evidence and Implications. Journal of Labor Economics, 7(1), 20-47. 
- Goldin, C. (1994). The U-Shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic 
Development and Economic History. NBER Working Papers No. 4707. 
- Greenstein, T. N. (1996). Husbands' Participation in Domestic Labor: Interactive 
Effects of Wives' and Husbands' Gender Ideologies. Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 58(3), 585-595. 
- Greenstein, T. N. (2000). Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor 
in the Home: A Replication and Extension. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62(2), 
322-335. 
- Gronau, R. (1973). The Intrafamily Allocation of Time: The Value of the 
Housewives' Time. American Economic Review, 63(4), 634-651. 
- Gronau, R. (1977). Leisure, Home Production and Work-The Theory of the 
Allocation of Time Revisited. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1099-1123. 
- Gronau, R. (1982). Inequality of Family Income: Do Wives' Earnings Matter? 
Population and Development Review, 8, Supplement: Income Distribution and the 
Family, 119-136. 
- Gustafsson, B. and Li, S. (2000). Economic transfonnation and the gender earnings 
gap in urban China. Journal of Population Economics, 13,305-329. 
- Hayghe, H. V. (1997): Developments in women's labor force participation. Monthly 
Labor Review, 120(9), 41-46. 
- Heckman, J. J. and Willis, R. J. (1977). A Beta-logistic Model for the Analysis of 
52 
Sequential Labor Force Participation by Married Women. Journal of Political 
Economy, 85(1),27-58. 
- Heckman, J. J. (1978). A Partial Survey of Recent Research on The Labor Supply of 
Women. American Economic Review, 68(2), Papers and Proceedings of the Ninetieth 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 200-207. 
- Hersch, J. and Stratton, L. S. (1994). Housework, Wages, and the Division of 
Housework Time for Employed Spouses. American Economic Review, 84(2), Papers 
and Proceedings of the Hundred and Sixth Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association, 120-125. 
- Hill, M. A. (1983). Female Labor Force Participation in Developing and Developed 
Countries--Consideration of the Informal Sector. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
65(3), 459-468. 
- Hughes, J. and Maurer-Fazio, M. (2002). Effects of Marriage, Education and 
Occupation on the Female/Male Wage Gap in China. Pacific Economic Review, 7(1), 
137-156. 
- Hyslop, D. R. (1999). State Dependence, Serial Correlation and Heterogeneity in 
Intertemporal Labor Force Participation of Married Women. Econometrica, 67(6), 
1255-1294. 
- Jaumotte, F. (2003). Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main 
Determinants in OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No. 376. 
- Johnston, G. (2005). Women's Participation in the Labour Force. New Zealand 
Treasury Working Paper 05/06. 
- Juhn, C. (1992). Decline of male labor market participation, the role of declining 
market opportunities. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), 79-12l. 
- Kalleberg, A. L. and Rosenfeld, R. A. (1990). Work in the Family and in the Labor 
Market: A Cross-National, Reciprocal Analysis. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 
52(2), 331-346. 
- Kamo, Y. (1988). Determinants of Household Division of Labor: Resources, Power, 
and Ideology. Journal of Family Issues, 9, 177-200. 
- Kooreman, P. and Kapteyn, A. (1987). A Disaggregated Analysis of the Allocation of 
Time within the Household. Journal of Political Economy, 95(2), 223-249. 
- Layard, R., Barton, M. and Zabalza, A. (1980). Married Women's Participation and 
Hours. fconomica, New Series, 47(185),51-72. 
- Lewin-Epstein, N., Stier, H. and Braun, M. (2006). The Division of Household 
Labor in Germany and Israel. Journal of Marriage and Family, 68, 1147- 1164. 
- Li, H. and Zax, J. (2002). Economic Transition and the Labor Market in China. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
- Li, H. and Zax, J. (2003). Labor Supply in Urban China. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 31, 795-81 7. 
- Li, H., Zhang, J., Sin, L. T. and Zhao, Y. (2006). Relative Earnings of Husbands and 
Wives in Urban China. China Economic Review, 17, 412-43l. 
- Liu, H. (2007). Economic Reforms and Gender Inequality in Urban China. CES 
2006 conference paper on Governing Rapid Growth in China: Efficiency, Equity, and 
53 
Institutions. 
- Liu, P. - W., Meng, X. and Zhang, J. (2000). Sectoral Gender Wage Differentials and 
Discrimination in the Transitional Chinese Economy. Journal of Population 
Economics, 13,331- 352. 
- Liu, Z. (2001). The Effects of Economic Reforms on Wage Inequality: Some 
Evidence from China. Applied Economics Letters, 8,285-288. 
- Macmillan, R. and Gartner, R. (1999). When She Brings Home the Bacon: 
Labor-Force Participation and the Risk of Spousal Violence against Women. Journal 
of Marriage and the Family, 61(4), 947-958. 
- Maret, E. and Finlay, B. (1984). The Distribution of Household Labor among 
Women in Dual-Earner Families. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 46(2), 
357-364. 
- Maurer-Fazio, M. and Hughes, J. (2002). The Effects of Market Liberalization on 
the Relative Earnings of Chinese Women. William Davidson Working Paper Number 
460. 
- Meng, X. and Zhang, J. (2001). The Two-Tier Labor Market in Urban China. 
Occupational Segregation and Wage Differentials between Urban Residents and Rural 
Migrants in Shanghai. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29, 485-504. 
- Millimet, D. L. (2000). The Impact of Children on Wages, Job Tenure, and the 
Division of Household Labour. Economic Journal, 11 0(462), Conference Papers, 
CI39- CI57. 
- Millimet, D. L. and Wang, L. (2006). A Distributional Analysis of the Gender 
Earnings Gap in Urban China. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy , 5(1), 
Article 5. 
- Mroz, T. A. (1987). The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women's 
Hours of Work to Economic and Statistical Assumptions. Econometrica, 55( 4), 
765- 799. 
- Nakamura, M., Nakamura, A. and Cull en, D. (1979). Job Opportunities, the Offered 
Wage, and the Labor Supply of Married Women. American Economic Review, 69(5), 
787- 805. 
- Nickols, S. Y. and Metzen, E. J. (1978). Housework Time of Husband and Wife. 
Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 7, 85- 97. 
- Nickols, S. Y. and Metzen, E. J. (1982). Impact of Wife's Employment upon 
Husband's Housework. Journal of Family Issues , 3, 199- 216. 
- Ng, Y. C. (2004). Economic Eevelopment, Human Capital, and Gender Earnings 
Differentials in China. Economics of Education Review, 23, 587- 603. 
- Ng, Y. C. (2007). Gender Earnings Differentials and Regional Economic 
Development in Urban China, 1988-97. Review of Income and Wealth, 53(1), 
148- 166. 
- Pampel, F. C. and Tanaka, K. (1986). Economic Development and Female Labor 
Force Participation: A Reconsideration. Social Forces, 64(3), 599- 619. 
- Parsons, D. O. (1980). Racial Trends in Male Labor Force Participation. American 
Economic Review, 70(5), 911- 920. 
- Parsons, D. O. (1980). The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation. Journal of 
54 
Political Economy, 88(1), 117-134. 
- Parsons, D. O. (1982). The Male Labour Force Participation Decision: Health, 
Reported Health, and Economic Incentives. Economica, New Series, 49(193),81- 91. 
- Pittman, J. F. and Blanchard, D. (1996). The Effects of Work History and Timing of 
Marriage on the Division of Household Labor: A Life-Course Perspective. Journal of 
Marriage and the Family, 58(1), 78-90. 
- Presser, H. B. (1994). Employment Schedules among Dual-Earner Spouses and the 
Division of Household Labor by Gender. American Sociological Review, 59(3), 
348- 364. 
- Reimers, C. W. (1985). Cultural Differences in Labor Force Participation Among 
Married Women. American Economic Review, 75(2), Papers and Proceedings of the 
Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 251- 255. 
- Rexroat, C. and Shehan, C. (1987). The Family Life Cycle and Spouses ' Time in 
Housework. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 49(4),737-750. 
- Ribar, D. C. (1992). Child Care and the Labor Supply of Married Women: Reduced 
Form Evidence. Journal of Human Resources, 27 (1), Special Issue on Child Care, 
134- 165. 
- Ross, C. E. (1987). The Division of Labor at Home. Social Forces, 65(3),816-833. 
- Schultz, T. P. (1990). Women's Changing Participation in the Labor Force: A World 
Perspective. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38(3), 457-488. 
- Semyonov, M. (1980). The Social Context of Women's Labor Force Participation: A 
Comparative Analysis. American Journal of Sociology, 86(3), 534-550. 
- Shamir, B. (1986). Unemployment and Household Division of Lab or. Journal of 
Marriage and the Family , 48(1), 195-206. 
- Shaw, K. L. (1989). Intertemporal Labor Supply and the Distribution of Family 
Income. Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(2), 196- 205. 
- Shen, J. and Deng, X. (2008). Gender Wage Inequality in the Transitional Chinese 
Economy: A Critical Review of Post-reform Research. Journal of Organisational 
Transformation and Social Change, 5(2), 109- 127. 
- Shu, X. (2005). Market Transition and Gender Segregation in Urban China. Social 
Science Quarterly , 85(5), 1299- 1323. 
- Shu, X. and Bian, Y. (2003). Market Transition and Gender Gap in Earnings in 
Urban China. Social Forces, 81(4),1107-1145. 
- Shu, X., Zhu, Y. and Zhang, Z. (2007). Global Economy and Gender Inequalities: 
The Case of the Urban Chinese Labor Market. Social Science Quarterly , 88(5), 
1307- 1332. 
- Smith, J. P. (1979). The Distribution of Family Earnings. Journal of Political 
Economy , 87(5), Part 2: Education and Income Distribution, S163- S192. 
- Smith, J. P. and Ward, M. P. (1985). Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor Force. 
Journal of Labor Economics, 3(1), Part 2: Trends in Women's Work, Education, and 
Family Building, S59-S90. 
- Solaz, A. (2005). Division of Domestic Work: Is There Adjustment between Partners 
When One is Unemployed? Review of Economics of the Household, 3, 387- 413. 
- Stafford, R., Backman, E. and Dibona, P. (1977). The Division of Labor among 
55 
Cohabiting and Married Couples. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 39(1), 43- 57. 
- Sundstr6m, M. and Stafford, F. P. (1992). Female labour force participation, fertility 
and public policy in Sweden. European Journal of Population, 8(3), 199-215. 
- Tansel, A. (2001). Economic Development and Female Labor Force Participation in 
Turkey: Time-Series Evidence and Cross-Province Estimates. ERC Working Paper No. 
01/05. 
- Vermeulen, F. (2005). And the Winner Is ... An empirical Evaluation of Unitary and 
Collective Labour Supply Models. Empirical Economics, 30, 711-734. 
- Vermeulen, F. (2006). A Collective Model for Female Labour Supply with 
Non-Participation and Taxation. Journal of Population Economics, 19,99-118. 
- Wales, T. J. and Woodland, A. D. (1977). Estimation of the Allocation of Time for 
Work, Leisure, and Housework. Econometrica, 45(1),115-132. 
- Wang, M. and Cai, F. (2008). Gender Earnings Differential in Urban China. Review 
of Development Economics, 12(2), 442-454. 
- Weiss, Y. and Gronau, R. (1981). Expected Interruptions in Labour Force 
Participation and Sex-Related Differences in Earnings Growth. Review of Economic 
Studies, 48(4), 607-619. 
- Wilkie, J. R. (1991). The Decline in Men's Labor Force Participation and Income 
and the Changing Structure of Family Economic Support. Journal of Marriage and 
the Family, 53(1),111-122. 
- Winegarden, C. R. (1987). Women's Labour Force Participation and the Distribution 
of Household Incomes: Evidence from Cross-National Data. Economica, New Series, 
54(214), 223-236. 
- Yueh, L. Y. (2004). Wage Reforms in China During the 1990s. Asian Economic 
Journal, 18(2), 149-164. 
- Zhang, L. and Dong, X. -V. (2008). Male-Female wage discrimination in Chinese 
industry. Economics of Transition, 16(1),85- 112. 
- Zhang, Y., Hannum, E. and Wang, M. (2008). Gender-Based Employment and 
Income Differences in Urban China: Considering the Contributions of Marriage and 
Parenthood. Social Forces, 86(4), 1529-1560. 
56 

CUHK Libraries 
I 
004660085 
